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The purpose of this paper is to lay out a model of
"planned managed change," and to show how it applies to the
implementation of information technology (IT) projects. Resis-
tance to change is a ubiquitous phenomenon and is often treated
as a mysterious and intractable force, implying negative motives
and attitudes on the part of the resisters. It is the purpose of
this analysis to show that resistance to change is a normal
understandable phenomenon, and to show how an understanding of
the change process can help to overcome such resistance.
Systems as Quasi-stationary Equilibria of Multiple Forces
In order to understand any kind of change, we must first
have a model of a "system" in a steady state, what Kurt Lewin so
aptly called a "quasi-stationary equilibrium" (Lewin, 1952;
Schein, 1972, 1985, 1987). A system can be an individual, a
group, or an entire organization, and any given system is usually
composed of a number of sub-systems. So when we do this kind of
analysis it is helpful at the outset to decide what system we are
focusing on.
The basic assumption is that any living system is always
in a state of change (growth, metamorphosis, or decline), but
1
that all systems are homeostatic, that is, they always tend
toward some kind of equilibrium. This equilibrium is achieved by
a balance of forces pushing in different directions. But,
because there are many forces acting, a change in some of these
forces will move the equilibrium to a new level. In this sense
the equilibrium is only "quasi-stationary."
If one is to change the equilibrium level of a dynamic
system such as a group or department or whole organization, one
must first identify with respect to one's change goal, what the
relevant forces are that are acting on that system. This
process, called "force-field analysis," is then a first step in
any managed cange program. If our analysis reveals that the
unit being changed is composed of a number of inter-connected
sub-systems, then we have to analyze each subsystem. We cannot
assume that the same forces apply across all of the sub-systems.
How this is done will be detailed later in this paper.
Stages of the Change Process
Any change process can be conceptualized as consisting
of three stages or phases, based on the above model of quasi-
stationary equilibria-- a stage of unfreezing, a stage of chang-
ing, and a stage of refreezing. No change will occur unless the
system is unfrozen, and no change will last unless the system is
refrozen. Most change theories tend to focus only on the middle
stage and then cannot account for inability to produce change in
the first place, or inability to maintain the changes that have
been achieved. The stages and their processes are outlined in
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Table 1.
Put Table 1 about here
Unfreezing
By far the most difficult and important stage is the
stage of unfreezing, the creation of a motivation to change.
This is accomplished by changing the forces acting on the system
such that:
1) The present state is somehow disconfirmed;
2) Some anxiety or guilt is aroused because some goals
*will not be met or standards will not be achieved;
3) Enough "psychological safety" is provided to make it
unnecessary for the target individuals or groups to
psychologically defend themselves because the dis-
confirming information is too threatening or the
anxiety or guilt are too high.
The essence of an effective unfreezing process is a
balancing of enough disconfirmation to arouse an optimal level of
anxiety or guilt, without arousing so much as to cause denial,
repression, projection, or some other defense mechanism. Most
analyses of unfreezing limit themselves to step 1-- how to
disconfirm or create pain-- and fail to note that unless the pain
is connected to something the members of the system care about,
and unless they feel safe enough to feel they can do something
about it, they have not really been unfrozen at all.
How the unfreezing occurs will vary with the circumstan-
ces. Often we find change easy to manage because we encounter a
system that is already unfrozen (e.g. the turnaround manager who
takes over a company that knows that unless it changes it will be
bankrupt and no-one will have a job). It is in the nature of
systems that they can be partially unfrozen by information that
has been received at some earlier time, but that not enough
psychological safety has been present to allow the individual or
group to consciously accept the necessity of change.
We see this in individual psychodynamics where in adult-
hood we "finally" deal with criticisms or feedback that we may
have received from parents or peers as children, but have repres-
sed until we felt secure enough to change. The observer may be
surprised at what seems to be a change without unfreezing, be-
cause he or she may not be aware of the prior disconfirmation
that had taken place. When we speak of systems as being "ready
to change," we often mean that they have had strong disconfirma-
tion in the past but have not felt secure enough to do something
about their situation.
If the system is not already unfrozen the change agent
has to develop a way of surfacing disconfirming information, a
process that is sometimes difficult and time consuming. And then
the information has to be developed in a way that is not too
threatening. The role of the change agent in unfreezing systems
is, therefore, one of the most important and yet most difficult.
When strong disconfirmation is needed, the person in
authority is often in the best position to provide it, but is
often also the person most likely to cause too much threat and
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thus arouse defensiveness. In such situations managers often use
outside consultants to provide the strong disconfirmation on the
theory that it is easier to accept negative information from a
presumably objective outsider. But such outside information is
often easy to discount on the grounds that the consultant "did
not really understand our situation."
What the effective manager acting as a change agent must
try to convey simultaneously is:
1) Your present behavior or attitude is unacceptable
(disconfirmation);
2) It is violating some of our standards or is causing
us to fail in getting the job done (induction of
guilt and/or anxiety); but,
3) I will help you to change and make you feel safe
while you learn a new behavior or attitude (creation
of psychological safety).
One of the reasons why it is important for people who
become targets of change to be involved early in the change
process is that one cannot assess how they will be threatened by
the disconfirmation or what problems they will have in making the
change unless one explores what help they will need to make the
change. The manager as change agent can be quite rigid in step 1
if he or she adequatly manages step 2 and 3.
An IT Example. In a study conducted of CEO's we found
that a number of them concluded that executive work stations
operated by the manager could be a useful executive tool for
electronic mail, word processing, MIS/MIC, and various kinds of
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spread-sheet analysis and modelling. The problem they faced was
how to get their various subordinates to accept the work stations
and to learn how to use them.
The disconfirmation typically came in the form of the
CEO announcing to his subordinates that he would start to monitor
some of their division or unit performance in terms of regular
reports that appeared directly on the CEO's terminal, and would
ask them questions about it. In other words past systems of
reporting and monitoring would no longer be acceptable. Or he
might say that he would start to communicate with them by means
of electronic mail only, and would put important messages into
the system by this means. In other words, the subordinates found
out that their routine behavior would no longer work with respect
to parts of their job, and they clearly felt anxious about their
boss finding out things they did not themselves know or telling
them things that they might not pick up. One can also assume
that a number of them felt guilty about not using "modern"
technologies and executive support systems.
At the same, however, effective CEO's not only provided
the necessary terminals, but, more importantly, created training
programs and provided coaches that would make it easy for the
subordinates to learn, and that would help them to overcome
whatever insecurity they might have about changing. If the
degree of threat or basis of the insecurity was more fundamental,
something that we will see below would have been revealed in a
force-field analysis, then additional unfreezing would have to
occur with respect to those people.
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Another powerful disconfirming force is the presenta-
tion of credible information that using a new system will drama-
tically increase productivity or quality, but, again, if the
source of threat is that such a system will cause people to lose
their jobs, some psychological safety has to be created before
the message will be accepted.
Changing Through Cognitive Redefinition
What unfreezing does is to motivate the change target to
look for new solutions that will bring things back into equili-
brium, and that will once again produce confirming information
that things are "OK." Where previously information, ideas,
suggestions, or even orders were ignored, once someone is un-
frozen, he or she is more likely to pay attention. They become
active problem solvers because they are uncomfortable.
If we are dealing with complex attitudinal change or
changes in shared basic assumptions (culture), we have the
additional problem that the new attitude or assumption may
initially not be understandable to the change targets. They know
"something" is wrong with the way they are thinking, but they
cannot conceive of any alternative way of thinking. For this
kind of situation, either or both of two change mechanisms have
to be considered:
1) Scanning the environment until a new formulation is
found and trying out various kinds of new behavior
until something that works is found; and/or
2) Finding a role model and learning a new point of view
through psychological "identification," learning by
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seeing the world through the eyes of the role model.
In either case, the new information causes change by
allowing "cognitive re-definition" to take place. For example,
when PCs are introduced into the executive suite, for some people
it will simply be a matter of learning a new skill that will not
require any cognitive re-definition. But for some managers the
dilemma will be that they see themselves as working primarily
with and through people, that they gather information through
face-to-face contacts, that they rely on their gut feel and
intuition to process information, and that they only trust their
ability to be persuasive in interpersonal encounters. They may
have developed the assumption that numerical data of the sort
that are processed in MIS/MIC systems are not good enough to act
on in the first place, and that communicating via E-mail makes it
impossible to tell what the other person is really thinking. It
is therefore inconceivable to them how IT can be seen as an
executive tool at all.
Such managers may be unfrozen in that they have been
strongly disconfirmed by their own bosses and feel ready to
change, but they truly don't know what to do, and they feel very
threatened because the assumptions on which they have built their
self-image of effectiveness are being challenged. If the CEO
presses hard enough they may scan the environment in the form of
trying various kinds of partial solutions, looking for PCs that
might be more versatile or user friendly, until they find some-
thing that seems to work.
Or, more likely, they will find a fellow executive who
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is enough like them to be a role model, and who has learned to
use the IT tools. They will identify with that person and try to
learn to see the world through his or her eyes. As they do this
they will cognitively redefine what the managerial job is, gradu-
ally changing some of their assumptions about their own intuitive
style and learning some of the new assumptions underlying the
information technology solutions. Most likely this will involve
cognitive "broadening" in the sense that they will learn how to
use IT to enhance their intuitive style, and how to use E mail to
supplement their face to face encounters. The nature of manage-
rial work will be redefined in their head.
Refreezing
Once the person has achieved a new set of cognitions and
attitudes, there remains the problem of refreezing. If others
with whom the person works do not support the new point of view,
they will simply cause another change process to occur or the
person will revert to the original view. Or if the new point of
view is too alien to other parts of his or her personality, over
time the new point of view will erode and again the person will
revert. For change to stick it has to be integrated into the
total psychic framework or personality, and has to be supported
by others whose opinions and perceptions the person cares about.
In the example of the CEO and his subordinates, if a
given manager learns to use the terminal and finds himself in a
new group that disdains such use, he will likely unlearn and
revert to his old attitude. Or, if he finds that his thinking
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style is genuinely incompatible with what the IT systems require
of him he, will find excuses or, in the extreme, leave the group.
One reason why user involvement is so critical in the introduc-
tion of IT systems, is that unless they are involved, the system
is likely to demand behavior that fundamentally does not fit the
user situation, and will, therefore never be refrozen.
The commonest example of failure of refreezing is when
we train people off site and then find that within weeks they
have "forgotten" everything they learned during training. The
problem is not forgetting, but that the new behavior or attitude
does not fit personally or into the group situation and is,
therefore, actively unlearned. For any change to be managed
effectively, the change agent must plan for all three stages and
must insure that each stage is successfully traversed.
A Map of the Change Management Process
The best formulation for thinking about the total change
process is the road map provided by Beckhard and Harris (1987) as
shown in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here
The first step is the most fundamental--providing a
credible answer to the question of "Why Change?" Too many change
processes are begun without a clear logic or goals that make
sense. And if the logic isn't clear to the change agent, it
surely will have no chance of ever being clear to the change
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targets. In selecting a change goal, five sets of issues or
questions need to be addressed:
1) What is the change agent's motivation? Whose inter-
ests will ultimately be served by the proposed change?
2) Is there a real need for change? Whose needs are
really the critical driving forces toward change? Is there a
choice about whether or not to make the change?
3) How realistic and feasible is the change? Are there
ultimate forces that would prevent a change no matter what?
4) Where is the energy for change? What forces are al-
ready available to harness to the change project?
5) How unfrozen is the system? If it is not unfrozen
how can one unfreeze it?
Notice that although unfreezing is the first stage of
the actual change process, one should not start an unfreezing
process until one has answered questions 1 to 4 to one's satis-
faction. The CEO's in my previous IT example must be clear why
they want to institute given systems, whose interests will be
served, how feasible it will be to get their subordinates to
actually use the systems, how much energy there is to make the
change, and how much unfreezing will be required?
As part of the preliminary diagnostic process one should
also tackle the question of what is the present state of the
system and what is the desired future state? As Beckhard and
Harris point out in their book, each of these diagnostic activi-
ties can, in their own right, be complicated and time consuming.
Once the present and future state have been defined, the
11
change agent can concentrate on defining the process of getting
from here to there and providing for the management of the tran-
sition process. In deciding on each of these steps the change
agent must also be clear about the various systems involved in
the change. The various diagnostic tools to be described below
pertain to each of the above steps, and, more importantly, also
help to define the various systems and sub-systems that have to
be considered in any change program.
Force Field Analysis
The essence of this technique is to analyze for any
given system what is keeping a quasi-stationary equilibrium in
its present state, and from this diagnosis to determine which
forces to attempt to alter in order to unfreeze the system. To
do this analysis one must first specify a present state and a
desired state for the system, as shown in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 about here
On the left of the line we can identify what are called
"driving forces," forces that are already acting in the direction
in which we want to move. For example, if we are trying to
increase productivity in a worker group, driving forces might be
supervisory pressure, piece work incentives, extra training for
workers, better tools and machines, competitor pressures, compe-
tition among worker groups, pride, desire to save the company and
hence one's own job, and so on. As one fills in the driving
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forces that may already be acting one is often puzzled why pro-
ductivity does not go up? Something must be restraining it.
On the right side of the line we can plot what those
restraining forces might be. For example, we might find that
workers are cynical and don't believe management's argument that
more productivity is essential to the survival of the company.
Or, they might believe that if they work harder for the incen-
tives, that sooner or later the piece work rate itself will be
cut, or that if they become more productive some workers will be
laid off. Over the years these forces may have led to group norms
of a "fair day's work for a fair day's pay" and no-one wants to
be a rate buster. Or workers may resent the close supervision
they are getting and are resisting all supervisory input just to
get back at supervision. The actual forces identified will, of
course, reflect the actual situation that is being analyzed.
In order to be thorough about identifying forces, I have
put at the bottom of Figure 2 the various categories of forces
that one should consider, from the broader technological, social,
economic, political, and cultural forces down to individual
forces.
Taking Action Based on the Force Field Analysis.
Having identified all the forces, and having now recog-
nized that the quasi-stationary equilibrium is not so hard to
understand once one realizes how "overdetermined" it is, what do
we do next?
1) Should one add driving forces? Certainly one way to
increase productivity is to escalate supervisory pressures, give
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workers more incentives, scare them with more economic data on
the disastrous consequences of not working harder, and so on.
This is generally easy to do because we usually have more control
of the driving forces, but it is NOT a good strategy because in
most change situations the more pressure we put on, the more
counter-forces we generate, all of which means that the total
tension in the system will increase. In labor relations one
often sees such a scenario developing until ultimately the system
explodes in the form of a strike. In the IT world the equivalent
is the sabotage or misuse of expensive and sophisticated systems
(Hirschhorn, 1987; Zuboff, 1988).
2) Should one remove restraining forces? Should one
build more trust so that workers are more likely to believe
management economic projections, or change group norms to reduce
the tendency toward restriction of output, or increase job
security, and so on? Removing restraining forces is generally
harder to do because we have less control over them, but it IS a
good strategy because if they can be removed, there are generally
enough driving forces in the system already, that the equilibrium
will move by itself, and total tension in the system will
decrease.
In deciding on which forces to attempt to influence we
have to consider our own access to those forces and our ability
to manipulate them. For each force thus identified we can draw a
new force field to diagnose further what might be involved. For
example, if we decide that we want to change the group norms of
restriction of output, we can draw a force field of what forces
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are already driving in this direction, and what forces are re-
straining this change. Though this process can be time consum-
ing, it is essential preparation before leaping into action,
because premature action is likely to be fruitless in that it is
likely to ignore some critical forces that should be considered.
For example, if in the productivity example we push
ahead without careful consideration, we might miss the point that
the group norms of restriction of output are based on a long
history of labor mistrusting management in this company because
of things that happened to the grandparents and parents of the
present worker group. In other words, the group attitude may be
by now a cultural assumption that is so taken for granted that it
is virtually an unchangeable force. An entire change program
might have to be undertaken just to unfreeze the system around
this single force before anything else can be accomplished.
Some Examples of IT Related Force-fields
In a workshop on change dealing with IT, groups of
managers and professors familiar with the problems of implement-
ing IT solutions tackled several change problems: the introduct-
ion of executive workstations, the use of IT to integrate staff
functions, and the introduction of CIM. The force fields devel-
oped by the groups (in approximately one to two hours) are shown
in Figures 3, 4, and 5.
____________________
Insert Figures 3, 4, and 5 about here
What these force fields typically reveal to the change
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planners is that some of the restraining forces are very power-
ful and will be difficult to change. An element of realism is
thus introduced into the planning process. Furthermore, the
force field allows the change planners to focus more precisely on
what exactly they are trying to do. For example, as one scans
the restraining forces in Figure 3 on executive workstations, it
is easy to see why it is so difficult to install them. Where
does one begin, particularly if it has become part of the sub-
culture that senior executive's work does not involve such tools?
If, on the other hand, one looks at the driving forces
only, it is hard to understand why such workstations have not
been implemented all over the place. The force field analysis
illustrates graphically how many forces may be acting on both
sides, and makes it possible for the change agent to think more
clearly about where and how to begin. For example, since there
are many possible restraining forces, it may be critical to
involve senior executives by means of interviews or committees to
determine which of the forces are especially strong and therefore
have to be dealt with first.
Similarly, we can notice that the groups found many pow-
erful restraining forces inhibiting the integration of staff
functions and the introduction of computer integrated manufactu-
ring systems (CIM). The diagnostic job is not finished with the
drawing of these force fields, but it is a good initial road map,
especially for the planning group. The tool enables planners to
pool and record their insights into the change problem quickly.
As a final point it should be noted that in each of the force
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fields, subcultural forces appear to be strong, suggesting to the
change planner that some cultural changes may have to occur, and
those are, of course, much more complicated and time consuming
(Schein, 1985).
A force field analysis reveals one aspect of the comple-
xity of the system, but it does not reveal some of the important
connections between the parts of the system that may be support-
ing some of the key forces. Therefore, in addition to the force
field analysis one should do some system mapping and role net-
work analysis.
Open Systems Planning
The purpose of this diagnostic tool is to reveal the
connections that exist between the target group or social system
and its various environments, in order to assess what role those
connections play either as driving or restraining forces (Beck-
hard and Harris, 1987). As part of the assessment of the present
state of the target system, we would lay out first the "demand
systems," all those stakeholders both inside and outside the
organization who make some kinds of demands on it, and the
"response systems," all those in the organization who are suppo-
sed to respond to these demands and how do they do it.
This kind of analysis, best done by a group familiar
with the situation of the target system, is best done visually by
drawing on flip charts the actual demand systems and their res-
ponse systems. Relative potency can then be shown graphically
with colored or heavier lines, and the picture allows one to see
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the whole force field simultaneously.
Such a picture typically reveals several important facts
relevant to the planning of change. First of all, we become
aware, as in force field analysis, that any system has many
forces acting on it, that it exists in multiple environments, and
that its responses to the multiple demands are a complex set of
compromises and negotiations among the various priorities.
For example, the CEO demanding that his division mana-
gers should adopt executive work stations and the decision
support systems that go with them may not be aware of the demands
that peers, staff groups, subordinates, suppliers, customers, IT
vendors, members of the community, the executive's family, and
others are already making, and that many of those demands are
incompatible or produce severe cognitive overload. When execu-
tives say they do not have time to learn a new system, we need to
understand this in the context of the overload that they may be
experiencing, not dismiss it as an excuse hiding other feelings.
The picture of the demand system can be elaborated by
now sketching in how we would like that system to look at some
time in the future. What do we want to respond to, and how do we
then create the right response systems. For example, we might
show technological forces as one of the demand systems and note
that the only response the organization has is the data process-
ing department's monitoring of technological developments. But
the internal power of this department may be so weak that infor-
mation dies there. An ideal future state might be a DP unit that
becomes internally a powerful demand systems to which line
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management responds constructively. That, in turn, might reveal
that the DP unit itself needs to undergo changes to make it more
influential and credible.
In other words the mapping process reveals where connec-
tions need to be weakened and strengthened, and where new change
targets have to be dealt with if the overall change project is to
work. The project becomes differentiated and more realistic as
the complexity of the social system is increasingly revealed.
This complexity also explains why change programs take so long,
sometimes as much as 10 to 20 years. Each sub-system with its
own sub-culture must go through all the stages of unfreezing,
changing, and refreezing. Successfully changing one sub-system
does not guarantee at all that the systems it is connected to
will automatically change. Only with repeated efforts to induce
change in every part of the total system can lasting efforts be
achieved, and that takes enormous time, commitment, and energy.
Role Mapping
Role mapping (Kahn et al, 1964) can be viewed as an
extension and refinement of open systems planning, in that it
focuses more precisely on a specific change target, a group or
manager, and then defines what are for that person or group the
relevant "role senders," those people or groups who have specific
expectations of him or the group. The target is put into the
center of the diagram and all possible senders are identified--
boss, peers, subordinates, friends, family, community members,
etc. etc. For each sender some effort is made to identify
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specifically what that sender expects, and the total set of
expectations is then examined for evidence of three kinds of
problems:
1) Role overload: the sum total of what is expected of
the target exceeds what the target could ever do.
2) Role ambiguity: some role senders are not clear or
send mixed signals, so that the target is not sure
what is expected vis-a-vis those senders.
3) Role conflict: some of the expectations are in
direct conflict with each other, requiring the
target to decide whose expectations will be respon-
ded to.
Role occupants of course have their own expectations of
themselves and are thus role senders as well. So one of the
commonest reasons for overload, ambiguity, and conflict is our
own expectations of ourselves. We may expect too much of our-
selves, or may not be clear what we think we should be doing, or
may find that what others expect of us is in conflict with some
of our own values and standards. Ethical and moral issues can
often be best understood in terms of conflicts between role
senders, especially when one of them is oneself (Schein, 1966).
Once one has identified the role network and its charac-
teristics, one can examine it for evidence of 1) where there
might be unusual sources of resistance to change (i.e. some
powerful role sender who expects something totally different from
what the change agent would like the target to do), or 2) where
there might already be some energy for change (i.e. where some
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role senders already want the target person or group to move in
the same direction as the change agent does, or where others have
already unfrozen the target).
Because unfreezing is so difficult and time consuming,
the location of forces that have already partially unfrozen the
target is probably one of the most powerful change tactics. In
other words, the change aent can hook on to energy that is
already in the system rather than having to inject the motivation
himself or herself. Locating where there is energy for change
becomes a major priority.
Open systems planning and role mapping together reveal
the connections between the various sub-systems and thus make it
clear how the change program must be designed, how long it might
take, and what kind of energy will be required to produce changes
in all of the parts involved. Having done all of this diagnos-
ing, how does the change agent decide to take some action?
Selecting First Steps
Most of what has been described so far goes on in a
planning mode, without the change agent needing to be involved in
any way with members of the target system other than the ones
helping him or her do the diagnostic planning. Going through the
above exercises is a way of making sure that one understands the
full complexity of what one is embarking on, and deals with it
realistically. But inevitably, the diagnostic work will reveal
gaps in knowledge or will suggest new targets or avenues of
action to consider.
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It is important to view any initial step that the change
agent takes as an opportunity to begin the change process itself.
And it is a fundamental principle of working with human systems
that any contact with the system is an intervention, even if the
intent is only diagnostic (Schein, 1987, 1988).
Even if the change agent only asks a few questions for
information, those questions guide the respondent's thinking,
focus attention on certain issues, indicate that somebody is
interested in those issues, and in other ways produce unknown
amounts of influence. Consequently, if influence is inevitable,
one might as well influence as much in the direction of the
planned change goals as possible. This line of thinking then
should define for the change agent both whom he or she decides to
talk to, and how the conversation is to be framed.
Criteria for initial intervention target
Change theorists have identified five useful criteria
for deciding whom to approach first:
1) Accessibility: One should select as an initial
target persons to whom one has access. The change agent might
decide that a most useful initial target and source of informa-
tion would be the Chairman of the Board, but that person might be
totally inaccessible.
2) Leverage: Assuming that the person is accessible, the
change agent must ask "How much leverage do I have with this
person? Do I have enough credibility to be taken seriously?
Will I be able to influence this person?"
3) Vulnerability: If I have access and leverage, I still
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have to be sure that the target I have chosen is vulnerable to
change. I might totally waste my time if I encounter someone so
set in his or her ways that talking to them would be pointless.
4) Appropriateness: If I have access, leverage, and
believe the target is vulnerable to change, I still have to ask
how appropriate is it, given my understanding of the total system
to initiate this change. Suppose I do get to the Chairman of the
Board and ask some questions about executive decision support
systems and their use in his company. Do I believe it is ethical-
ly and otherwise appropriate for me to influence him to think
about these matters?
5) Linkage: Finally, if I am comfortable with all of
the above criteria, I still have to ask what my target person's
linkage is to the rest of the system. Suppose, for example that
this Chairman is a lame duck who has lost all influence in the
company. My changing him then would have relatively little
impact on the rest of the system. If I want that influence I
should be talking to people whose linkage is such that they will
proliferate whatever new ideas come from our joint interaction.
In most situations, we will face many choices of where
to start and will have to do a complex mental calculus around the
five criteria identified. One cannot always maximize all of the
criteria, but it is important to know when one decides to
approach this or that person, what one is gaining and what one is
giving up. One should not start crashing around asking questions
without some conscious plan.
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Process Consultation as an Intervention Model
In my experience the best way to approach any diagnostic
situation is to view it as an intervention and to judge the
appropriateness of that intervention in terms of the criteria
that should guide any clinical or consulting process (Schein,
1987, 1988). Whether one is an outside professional or an inside
manager, it is my assumption that interventions work best when
one considers fully the needs of the client/target, and attempts
as best one can to be helpful at all times.
From the point of view of process consultation as a
philosophy of how to be most helpful as well as influential, it
is essential that the client/target be involved in the diagnostic
process and maintain ownership of whatever part of the problem is
his or hers. To illustrate with the example of the CEO "impo-
sing" executive work stations on his subordinates, it is my
belief that this process will work best if the CEO first creates
a problem for the subordinates by stating that he will now work
in a different way, something that is his prerogative (disconfir-
mation). Having said that and thereby started to unfreeze the
system, the CEO should now help the subordinates to own and solve
the problem (provide psychological safety).
This can be done by inquiring what they propose to do
about getting themselves up to speed in using a system compatible
with his, or he can ask them what help they want from him in
getting hooked into the system, or he can ask what problems this
might create for them and how they could best be overcome, or he
can point out how others have solved the problem (encourage
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scanning and identification).
What all of these tactics have in common is that once
the direction of the change is clear, the change agent should
help achieve that direction, not to use pressure tactics or
coercion. And the best way to help at this point is to get very
client/target oriented, sympathetic to their resistances, and
ready to be involved with their problems as they see them. For
example, as the CEO I can say sympathetically to my key subordi-
nates: "I know that your managerial style is different and that
the use of the work station may not be how you do things, but I
do need to use this tool and I find it very helpful, so I am
asking you to learn how to use it because I need your help and am
therefore willing to help you in any way I can. Tell me what
problems you have with it and I will try to help you with them."
What must be avoided is the power message "do it because
I am the boss and it will be good for you." Most people in
organizational life know how to subvert and sabotage orders of
this sort, but will be very responsive to a boss or change agent
who needs help and is willing to help in turn.
What the change agent must mentally achieve at this
point is a "spirit of inquiry" (Bennis, 1962), a willingness and
ability to listen to how the world really looks from the perspec-
tive of the respondent. If that respondent is a change target,
it is especially important to be able to be empathic in order to
create the necessary psychological safety for the change to
occur.
For example, the CEO who really listens may discover
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that one of his subordinates really is hiding the fact that he
would be embarrassed to reveal to any trainer how little he is
able to understand the rudiments of a keyboard and a workstation.
Maybe he doesn't even know how to spell and can hide that lack by
always dictating his letters. Having to learn to type would
reveal the hidden flaw, something that the person will avoid at
all costs. If that is the source of the resistance, the CEO
might well choose to compromise and agree to let that individual
work through his secretary. Each subordinate might have a
different reason for resistance and the smart CEO change agent
will deal with each one sympathetically as a problem to be
solved.
What the change agent must avoid at all costs is to get
angry at resistance, sabotage, or subversion. Assume that there
is a good reason and maintain a spirit of inquiry to find out
what the reason is and how it might best be dealt with. Each
subordinate might be told that having to interact with the CEO on
the system is indeed non-negotiable, but how each subordinate
does it, might be highly negotiable as long as it ets done
within whatever time frame makes sense.
To put the matter another way, if the change agent is an
"outsider," maybe a DP consultant working this problem, he or she
can take a comparable approach by saying to a given manager "It
appears that your boss has decided to use this system and will
want to communicate with you on it. That seems to be a given.
Now how can I be most helpful to you in figuring out how you can
best get yourself into position to work with your boss on it?"
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The common finding from IT implementation projects that
they work best when the ultimate users are involved in the design
of the system is understandable from this point of view. Only
the users, the change targets, fully understand their own situa-
tion, and it is the task of the change agent, consultant, system
designer to create a dialogue that permits the clients to fully
express themselves and their needs. Resistance to change can be
overcome if people have the feeling their concerns are being
heard, and that their needs are being taken into account.
The Change Process in Perspective
All of the processes and tools described above will be
used in a given project, most of them simultaneously. It is
desirable at the beginning of the change project to take the time
to do as much diagnostic work as possible without involving the
client, so that the initial interventions can be made in the most
helpful way, but often the change agent must involve the client
in order to get the most basic kind of diagnostic information.
Again, Kurt Lewin in his wisdom had it right. He said
"in order to understand a system you should try to change it."
The implication is that one cannot fully understand all of the
forces acting until one elicits some of them. So in any given
change project one constantly recycles through diagnostic and
intervention processes, enriching one's understanding with each
cycle. And one constantly should re-ask the fundamental
questions: Why change? How appropriate is this change? Am I
approaching it in the right way? What do I need to do different-
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ly based on what I learned in the last round?
Even if the change is being induced from a position of
power, it is essential for the change agent to learn the even
greater power of being helpful and supportive. People must be
unfrozen to change, they must hurt somewhere. But that is not
enough. Equally important is their sense of psychological safety
that it is OK to try something new, to give up something old and
familiar. The smart change agent will make his targets feel
secure. Only then will their resistance genuinely give way.
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Table 1
A Model of Planned Change
Unfreezing: Creating motivation to change
Disconfirmation
Guilt / anxiety
Psychological safety
Changing: Creating new beliefs, values, behavior
Identification, imitation
Scanning, trial and error
Refreezing: Stabilizing the changes
Integration into personality
Integration into key relationships
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Managing during the
transition state
Figure 1
A Map of the Change Management Process
Beckhard & Harris, 1987
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Why change?
Determining the need for change
Determining the degree of choice
about whether to change
_ .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I
Getting from here to there:
Assessing the present in terms
of the future to determine
the work to be done
Present State --- _- Desired State
Categories of Forces
Technological
Economic
Political
Socio-cultural
Organizational
Policy
Structural
Group
Interpersonal
Individual/Personal
Figure 2
Force-Field Analysis
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